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After You: May Action by the Rich Be
Contingent Upon Action by the Poor?
HENRY SHUE °
Equity, or fairness, is at the heart of debates about possible international
action to constrain global warming.' As two of the most important
commentators on these negotiations, Michael Grubb and James Sebenius,
have remarked:
The allocation problem is unavoidable whatever control system is
adopted, whether it be national emission targets, taxes, or other
approaches. All systems that will have global impact will impose
costs on participants, and must include some resource transfers if
poorer countries are to take part .... [I]n practice, some degree of
equity considerations have appeared as a consistent feature in a
large number of negotiated international environmental and natural
resource regimes. ... Pure equity may well have a stronger role to
play than in many agreements, in part because of the economic
stakes involved combined with the need to gain widespread and
very long term adherence to a control regime.2
* Henry Shue is the Wyn and William Y. Hutchinson Professor of Ethics & Public Life at
Cornell University and the first Director of Cornell's Program on Ethics & Public Life. After studying
at Merton College, Oxford, as a Rhodes Scholar, he received his Ph.D. from Princeton in the
Interdepartmental Program on Political Philosophy. In 1976 he became a founding member of the
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, a research center in the Washington area devoted to the
examination of the ethical aspects of public affairs. He is the author of BASIC RIGHTS (Princeton, 1980).
Professor Shue has concentrated upon ethical issues in foreign policy, including the appropriate role
for human rights in foreign policy, the moral basis for American relations with the Third World, moral
issues affecting the Strategic Defense Initiative and alternative forms of nuclear deterrence,
and-currently-the fairness of the terms of international agreements to deal with global environmental
problems like global warming.
i. Lawyers talk of "equity." Philosophers, and ordinary people, talk of "fairness." Belonging
to at least one of the latter two categories, I will talk of "fairness." On the matters at hand, nothing that
I can see turns on this terminology.
2. Michael Grubb & James K. Sebenius, Participation, Allocation and Adaptability in
International Tradeable Emission Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Control, in CLIMATE CHANGE:
DESIGNING A TRADEABLE PERMIT SYSTEM 193 (OECD Documents 1992). 1 have explored some
implications of the impossibility in this case of skirting around the issues of fairness in Henry Shue, The
Unavoidability of Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 373, 373-97 (Andrew
Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992).
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By "pure equity," Grubb and Sebenius mean equity taken seriously in its
own right, equity per se, as distinguished from instrumental uses of equity
for rhetorical and political purposes not intrinsically connected with equity.
The issues about equity, or fairness, can be distinguished into four
practically related but analytically separable questions:
1. What is a fair allocation of the costs of preventing the global
warming that is still avoidable?;
2. What is a fair allocation of the costs of coping with the social
consequences of the global warming that will not in fact be
avoided?;
3. What background allocation of wealth would allow international
bargaining (about issues, like 1 and 2, to be a fair process)?;
and
4. What is a fair allocation of emissions of greenhouse gases (over
the long-term and during the transition to the long-term
allocation)?3
It is a mistake to attempt to answer question 1 about the costs of prevention,
or mitigation, without simultaneously answering question 2 about the costs
of coping, or adaptation, because what is a fair allocation of the costs of
prevention depends in part upon what the allocation of the costs of coping
is going to be.4
In this article, I will discuss one aspect of the relation between the
answer to question 4 (long-term allocation of emissions) and question 1
(costs of mitigation). If the current allocation of emissions is grossly
inequitable, or unfair, compared to an allocation that would be acceptable
over the long-term, those with the inequitable current advantage ought to
begin reducing emissions immediately at their own expense, and thereby
contribute to the cost of global warming prevention, irrespective of whether'
an international agreement exists regarding any of the four questions. In
other words, I suggest that one can get at least a partial answer to question
4 quite readily with implications about how to answer question 1.
3. Henry Shue, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, 15 LAw & POLICY 40(1993). The
heart of this analysis has also appeared as Henry Shue, Four Questions of Justice, in AGRICULTURAL
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 214 (Harry M. Kaiser & Thomas E. Drennen eds., 1993).
4. Shue, supra note 2.
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I. COOPERATIVE STRATEGY BETWEEN RICH AND POOR
What would be the quidpro quo in a cooperative strategy between rich
peoples and poor peoples to prevent, or at least to combat, global
warming?s I assume that the global total of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions must, at the very least, be prevented from continuing to rise. The
most authoritative study by leading scientists from several countries holds
that the global total must be sharply reduced.6 Although I am thoroughly
convinced that we face this far greater challenge of scaling back the total
emissions, any cooperative strategy faces a difficulty of the same shape,
although not the same magnitude, even if we must only stop increasing the
total. Even so, the task is daunting. While the global total of GHG
emissions must stop growing, GHG emissions generated by the
impoverished masses of the planet must grow if these individuals are to rise
above the poverty in which generations have been trapped. The overall total
of GHG emissions must cease growing while there is continued growth in
one part of that total, the part generated by the poor. Arithmetically, this
can be accomplished only if the only other part, the part generated by the
rich, shrinks. In other words, even if the scientific consensus were wrong
and the overall total did not need to shrink but needed only to be held
constant, the contribution to the total by the rich would have to shrink by
at least as much as the amount by which emissions by those rising out of
poverty increase.
What is a reasonable quid pro quo? What may the rich and the poor
ask of each other?
5. I will sometimes use "peoples," along with "nations," "states," and "countries," in order to
signal that I am not committed to any particular form of organization for large political societies and
certainly not to the contemporary nation-state. Cf John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 41 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
6. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC ScIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1990); the
brief "Policymakers' Summary" is also available in a separate and more colorful form as SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE POLICYMAKERS' SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (WMO/JNEP 1990). See also
CLIMATE CHANGE 1992: THE SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT TO THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (J.T.
Houghton et al. eds., 1992).
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A. Contributions by the Poor
Two dramatic requests that need to be made of the poor peoples are
abundantly clear. First, the rich are clearly asking the poor to settle for
levels of emissions per capita far below the current levels of the rich, that
is, the rich are asking the poor to choose never to approach the levels that
the rich currently produce. The poor must prepare to live with a level of
economic activity compatible with per capita GHG emissions well below the
present levels of the rich.7 The planet simply could not tolerate a majority
emitting GHGs at the per capita rate reached by today's rich minority, or
anywhere near that rate. Even per capita rates well below those of the
current rich minority, if produced by a majority of humanity, would send the
global total emissions-which must, at the very least, be held
constant-skyrocketing.
A unique sacrifice is, then, being asked of the poor majority of
humanity: never before in recorded history have people ever chosen to live
at an economic level both (a) much lower than levels previously attained by
other people, and (b) lower than they themselves could sustain, for at least
some time, with their own resources. The long-run unsustainability of
higher emissions levels would eventually reach everyone, including the poor,
but they could temporarily enjoy the good times that the rich have been
enjoying for decades. Is it humanly possible for whole peoples to choose
less rather than more? We are asking people who have never enjoyed a
plentiful, or even an economically adequate life, to accept and help to
implement a limit on the hopes they can have for their children's and
grandchildren's economic welfare. They are asked to conspire in the
imposition of limits on their own children's dreams.
Everything said thus far would be true even if there were now zero
growth in human numbers, not the already frequent doubling of the global
human population, which is becoming more frequent. The more humans
there are, the lower the per capita emissions rate must be in order for the
global total of emissions to hold constant. This is arithmetically evident.
7. As I briefly indicate infra, emission levels could be kept low without keeping economic
activity low provided only that we developed and switched to an energy technology that emits no GHGs,
like solar energy. I do not take this seriously in this discussion only because our politicians do not take
it seriously in practice.
[Vol. 1: 343
After You
At some number of humans, the emissions rate per capita would become
unbearably low.
The second request to be made of the poor, then, is energetic family
planning. The rights of poor women to make their own choices must be
respected, but all women and men must be shown reasons and provided with
incentives to have small families. I hasten to add what I hope is generally
understood by now: population growth is stimulated, not discouraged, by
poverty. Starvation is not an effective, even were it a morally tolerable,
method of population control over the long-term. "Energetic family
planning" is not intended here as code for continuing to tolerate absolute
poverty. On the contrary, even if there were no other sufficient reason to
promote economic improvements,8 promoting effective family planning
would be reason enough to relieve crushing Third World debt and to take
the other measures necessary for economic growth among the poorest.9
The second request, like the first, is unprecedented and extreme.
Fertility rates among the rich decreased only when the prospects for each
successive generation seemed to be better than the one before. Parents in
today's poor countries will, by contrast, be asked to have fewer children in
a context in which economic improvement, though perceptible, is limited.
At best, this is uncharted psychological terrain. Possibly, the rich will be
asking parents in the poorest regions of the world to show a level of concern
about the global environment unimaginable among today's rich. There
must, we said first, be a limit on their children's dreams. There must also
be a limit on the numbers of those very children. What are the rich
prepared to offer as their part of the global effort?
B. Contributions by the Rich
The rich countries must emit less greenhouse gas. The rich countries
must reduce their GHG emissions in order for the global total to remain
constant, if the poorest billion are to be able to improve their lives. We
must consume less and, probably, produce less. This too will obviously be
8. There are several others, including ethical ones.
9. Cf Nathan Keyfitz, Population Growth Can Prevent the Development that Would Slow
Population Growth, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 39 (Jessica Tuchman Mathews ed.,
1991).
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unprecedented. It will take a genuine leader, a kind not now visible, who
will, as must be done, promise people less.
There are two respects in which this overstates the challenge. First,
there is undoubtedly a huge difference between standard of living, as
measured by conventional economics, and quality of life. Much of what
sustains a consumerist economy not only clogs our landfills but dulls our
senses, clutters our minds, erodes our health, and fritters away our time and
natural resources. We could clearly live much richer lives if we could be
free from many of the gadgets, widgets, and other expensive junk that we
sell to each other and then quickly discard. All that can be said for much
of the stuff that expands the gross national product (GNP) is that making it,
advertising it, distributing it, and discarding it all create jobs. Jobs are vital,
so the rich need to create different kinds of jobs that, besides providing
people with income, add to the quality of life.
A less wasteful way of life would surely reduce some aspects of
"standard of living" as it is currently (mis-)defined: there would certainly
be fewer goods produced and fewer resources, probably including less
energy, consumed. Insofar as less carbon-based energy was consumed, we
would thereby reduce GHG emissions. A gallon of gasoline not purchased
and burned means a smaller GNP (which has been considered bad) and less
GHG emissions (which is, in fact, good). We could surely reduce GHG
emissions while uncluttering and improving the quality of our lives. This
would be doubly efficient: using less (quantity) to produce more (quality).
Obviously, quality is complex. But many people would grant at least the
negative thesis that quality of life would increase if the goods and services
of our bizarre consumerist society, driven by artificial wants created out of
whole cloth by television advertising, were reduced.
Second, more advanced energy technology would allow maintenance of
current levels of economic activity with great reductions in GHG emissions.
We could, if we chose, reduce the destructive emissions while maintaining,
or even increasing, the economic activity, provided the energy sources were
not carbon-based. All fossil fuel (coal, oil, and gas) is carbon-based.
Burning it for energy releases carbon dioxide (CO 2), the single worst
man-made GHG. As long as energy comes from burning fossil fuel and
releasing CO2, we face a wrenching choice between expanding the economy
and reducing GHG emissions. Yet that choice is forced upon us only by
our failure to invest enough in researching and developing alternative
sources of energy and requiring internalization of the astronomical military,
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social, environmental, health, and other costs of reliance on a system of oil-
moving tankers whose spills wreck the habitat and gas-burning automobiles
whose fumes wreck the cities. °
If we switch to non-carbon-based energy, we may safely, as far as the
danger of global warming is concerned, continue to increase levels of
economic activity. We could, then, continue, in particular, to stimulate
artificial wants and to satisfy them with expensive, expendable,
energy-eating but employment-producing gadgets, if that was how we
wanted to keep each other in jobs. In sum, if we would dethrone fossil
fuels, we would not need to reduce economic activity. Our consumerist
economy is sterile, without soul and not worth saving if we are not capable
of creating different kinds of jobs that add to the quality of life instead of
detract from it. But that is no argument against developing energy
technologies which would give us the choice. More importantly, the world's
impoverished need higher levels of economic activity and millions more
jobs, and it would be wonderful if this activity were created and sustained
without GHG emissions, as it certainly could largely be.
Nevertheless, this argument is based on the assumption that current
political leaders are incapable of breaking the fossil fuel dependency.
Without effective leadership, GHG emissions can be reduced only by
reducing energy usage. This would require reducing economic activity and
GNP, once maximum efficiency has been attained through the elimination
of sheer waste. This assumption is born out of political pessimism, for no
leader in an industrialized country yet shows vision and courage to lead a
revolution from entrenched energy habits, especially now that the fossil fuels
of the former Soviet Union lie open to outside exploitation. If this
assumption is, in fact, without merit, I will be very happy, and the problems
discussed here will be considerably easier to handle.
II. FAIR TRANSITION
Issues concerning the fairness of alternative plans for transition to a
world with a constant and sustainable total of GHG emissions and only
10. Solar energy is one of several sources with absolutely no GHG emissions; obviously this is
not the place to consider which is precisely the best alternative, or package of alternatives, to fossil fuel,
so I will simply refer negatively to non-carbon-based energy.
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moderate inequalities in global levels of emissions fall mostly on the side
of the rich peoples. The poor have little flexibility and few choices.
A. "Aggressive Population Control"
If it were possible to stabilize population size through an aggressive
program of population control, one might have to consider the moral merits.
The quality of life of future generations might depend upon the population
size at which human population is stabilized. In short, the stakes are high
enough that one might at least consider even the violation of rights in order
to improve the outcome for numberless succeeding generations. It may be
worth mentioning very briefly why this melodramatic option is not open in
the poor countries. For the more people among whom the global total of
emissions must be divided, the smaller the per capita share. This makes the
stakes in bringing the explosion of population under control very high. It
might be thought that the urgency of the crisis dictates some kind of
aggressive campaign of population control.
Recent experiences of the world's two most populous countries, China
and India, are widely seen as testimony to the fact that "aggressive
population control" is an intellectual's fantasy and the kind of quick-fix that
virtually never works jn practice. Men and women care profoundly about
how many children they have, and the worse their economic condition, the
more children they tend to want. Attempts by the State to force them to
have fewer than they want meet either open rebellion, as in the case of
Indira Gandhi's India, or evasion and subversion, as in the case of Deng's
China. The aggressive Indian policy was openly abandoned; the Chinese
one-child policy is quietly unraveling as the central government loses its
grip on the levers that it used to employ to coerce or pressure would-be
parents. Without thorough totalitarianism, parents must themselves want
fewer children if they are to have fewer children. The desire for fewer
children tends to come only with improving economic conditions (which,
interestingly, are arising in China for some of the same reasons the State is
losing its ability to enforce the one-child policy). Accordingly, while the
demographics are far more complex than indicated, draconian measures,
while perhaps fascinating for intellectuals to debate, are of no practical
interest. Basically, birth rates will decline when quality of life improves,
and not before.
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For the rich, the fundamental question is: how rapidly, and at what
price in economic dislocation for ourselves, should we reduce GHG
emissions? How much time may we take in reaching the goal of a fair
share of a sustainable total? What are the factors, ethical and non-ethical,
that determine the answer? Within the ethical considerations, exactly what
kind of imperative do we face? Here, we face real choices.
B. The No-Regrets Budget
The reduction in emissions has at least two stages. First is what might
be called the no-regrets stage, the stage in which sheer waste of energy, the
production of which emits GHGs, is reduced. Continued use of
incandescent light bulbs, for example, simply wastes electricity, the
production of which releases annually as much GHG as the burning of
thousands of acres of tropical forests. New generation short fluorescent
bulbs provide the same light for so much less electricity that the savings in
electricity bills quickly pays for the new bulbs, even though they cost
several times the price of incandescents." Only ignorance, indifference,
and vested interests in obsolete technology stand in the way of a great deal
of no cost-indeed, profitable-reduction in emissions. 2
In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union the waste is still more
colossal. Not all this environmentally destructive waste of energy could be
eliminated at a net profit over a short time. Many instances require the
wholesale replacement of large facilities by expensive new technology.
Naturally, disputes are underway about the full extent of profitable
reductions of the pure waste of energy. Whatever the precise extent of the
no-regrets changes, there is a broad consensus that the opportunities for
them are extensive and economically significant. Meanwhile, from an
ethical point of view any failure to act in these instances is analogous to a
refusal to rescue a drowning person by someone who would benefit from the
exercise involved in the swim: it is fecklessness approaching perversity.
Thus, it is only after the initial stage of no-regrets reductions in
emissions-primarily through reduction in waste of energy-that any net
I1. See Thomas E. Drennen & Duane Chapman, Negotiating A Response to Climate Change:
The Role of Biological Emissions, 10(3) CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUEs 49, 55-56 (July 1992).
12. Alliance to Save Energy et al., AMERICA'S ENERGY CHOICES: INVESTING IN A STRONG
ECONOMY AND A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT (1991).
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costs in conventional economic terms would be incurred. We must budget
for the necessary changes, for example, purchasing fluorescent bulbs. Yet
this budget can be replenished from the savings its investment will generate
in the short-run. Call this the "no-regrets" budget.
C. The Mitigation Budget
Only at a second stage come the true costs of mitigation. These are the
costs of doing what we would have no other reason to do if we were not
bound to resist global warming. Here is where the ethical considerations
come to bear in major and non-obvious ways. Here is where the ethical
issues about how costs are conceived make all the difference, provided one
assumes that it is possible to cut emissions faster by spending more
efficiently. How large any mitigation budget ought to be (another way of
asking how rapid the transition ought to be from where we are now to
where we ought to end up) depends on what kind of act, from an ethical
point of view, a people would perform in resisting global warming to any
specific extent. Specifically, whether their action and its attendant cost
would constitute their volunteering discretionary help or their ceasing
wrongful harm. Most people seem to think that it is much worse to keep
wrongfully harming others than it is not to start helping them. 3 Thus an
obligation to eliminate certain emissions would be much stronger if the
emissions were wrongfully harming others than it would be if the
elimination of those emissions would merely be helpful to others.
A person can be wronged without being harmed (e.g., denied seating
through racial discrimination on a plane which then crashes, leaving the
wronged party much better off for having been wronged), but one cannot be
harmed without being wronged. Simply being made worse off (e.g., driven
out of business by a legal and fair competitor) does not constitute suffering
harm. To be harmed means to be made worse off in some wrongful way.
One clear example of being harmed is being made worse off through the
violation of one of one's rights (e.g., denied seating through racial prejudice
on a plane that would have delivered one to one's destination safely and on
time). One can also be harmed by being made worse off through being
13. I am inclined to slice the conceptual pie at a different point from the line between not helping
and harming, but since I am in a minority, it is more important to see what follows from the standard
view held by most people.
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deprived of one's fair share. Harms can be inflicted directly or indirectly,
although, all other things being equal, the more indirect the infliction of the
harm the less moral responsibility the source of the harm bears for it.
The next question is: does the rich's continual engagagement in
business as usual (emiting large quantities of GHGs) constitute an infliction
of harm on anyone? Or does it constitute instead merely declining to pitch
in to help with the problem of global warming? This query relates to the
issue of the speed at which the rich should make the transition away from
current practices; when one is actually engaged in harming others one ought
to stop.
Obviously, one could consider whether past emissions of greenhouse
gases were wrong. Yet, I want to concentrate here on future emissions for
two main reasons. First, if no good case can be made for treating future
emissions as wrong, it will be all the clearer that past emissions cannot
reasonably be treated as wrong. Past emissions involve additional issues.
One example is the foreseeability of the seriousness of the risk of global
warming.
Second, it is urgent that we know how to think about future emissions
for the simple reason that we still control them and can still decide how
much effort to make to reduce them. If it is wrong to release future
emissions, it is much more imperative to stop them than if their release were
merely costly but not genuinely wrong. Although it is important to settle
whether our forbearers did wrong to other people in releasing past
emissions, the emissions themselves have either done their damage or are
doing it in ways that we cannot any longer affect. What would make future
emissions wrong? They are wrong if they consume a grossly unfair
proportion of a limited total. They are wrong if they make others worse off
in a manner that is unfair.
III. NATURALLY LIMITED SUPPLIES
Supplies of things come in at least four rough categories. First, there
are supplies that are entirely within human discretion (e.g., the money
supply). If the relevant bureaucrats think more money is a good idea, then
more money is, for better or worse, printed. The increase in the supply of
money is by no means without costs, such as inflation, but if those with
power decide there should be more, there is more.
1994]
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Second, there are supplies that can be increased, not by bureaucratic fiat,
but only through human investment of some combination of money, effort,
and ingenuity, plus the "cooperation" of the relevant natural or social forces.
For example, the supply of paper at some future date could be increased by
planting more trees now, or the supply of jobs at a future time could be
increased by intelligent selection of economic policies now, provided a
number of factors outside of human control go well. These two kinds of
supplies are more or less under human control, although the latter depends
on contributing factors that are not.
Third, there are supplies that are, for all practical purposes, natural and
beyond human control but unlimited (e.g., sunlight). Relative to imaginable
human demand, the total supply is unlimited; the overall supply vastly
exceeds any conceivable demand. Notoriously, it is turning out that fewer
and fewer things actually belong in this category of unlimited natural
supplies. Yet, while sunlight is limited in particular places at particular
times, both naturally and as a result of smog, the aggregate amount available
to the planet as a whole exceeds any imaginable need (which is one of the
many appeals of solar energy).
Water, on the other hand, which used to seem abundant overall, is
turning out to be chronically and severely limited. Even in the areas with
relatively abundant and reliable rainfall, copious irrigation by massive
agribusinesses, combined with profligate usage in burgeoning suburbs where
brown lawns are viewed as evidence of criminal negligence, pumps down
the groundwater levels much faster than normal rainfall can replenish them.
Thus we confront an instance of the fourth kind of supply: supplies that are
natural and limited and, for all practical purposes, cannot be increased by
humans-by money, effort, and ingenuity, or by any other currently feasible
means.
All this about supplies, man-made and natural, limited and unlimited, is
perfectly obvious, if fairly crude. The only point for which I want to
employ these categories is: dramatic implications result from the discovery
that something that had generally been believed to be naturally unlimited is
in fact naturally limited, that is, something that had been placed in the third
category (correctly or incorrectly) belongs now, if not also then, in the
fourth. A huge store of ethical considerations that are irrelevant to
unlimited supplies "lock-in" when there turns out to be scarcity. Where
there is scarcity, important ethical issues arise that do not arise amidst
plenty. The fundamental fact is that it does not matter who gets what
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portion of an unlimited supply-it is not evident that "portion" really makes
any sense in that instance, any more than one can calculate a percentage of
an infinite number. When, by contrast, there is scarcity, everything changes
and who gets which portion becomes overridingly important. When the
total supply is fixed and beyond human control, human shares become
"zero-sum": each bit that I get is a bit that you do not get, and vice versa.
This means that I can only become better off by making someone else worse
off. In economists' jargon, no Pareto improvements are possible. 14 As I
emphasized above, making someone worse off need not entail harming her;
one person has harmed another only if he has made her worse off in a
manner that is wrong.
An earlier belief that the supply of something was natural and unlimited
also need not have been false, at least as a belief relative to human demand
at that earlier time. Water is a leading case. When human population and
agricultural activity were sufficiently small, there was, for all practical
purposes, an unlimited supply of water. Events may have overtaken him to
a greater extent than he realized by the time that he said it, but Locke was
certainly correct, at least about earlier periods, when he wrote about drinking
from the stream while leaving "enough and as good" behind for others. 5
Even after it came to be necessary to move large quantities of water for the
satisfaction of human demand, via dams and pipelines, plenty was available
if human ingenuity and investment could deliver it to the right place. But
no more: some of the most vicious political battles in the U.S. today are
over water in the Southwest and California. 6 The same is true around the
world from the Narmada to the Yangtze. Relative to human demands for
water, the supply of water is limited; the total natural supply cannot be
changed by human action.
Odd as it may sound, an intellectual revolution is occurring on the
subject of man-made wastes, although the word is spreading much too
slowly. I am old enough to remember having been unashamed as a youth
to have the job of gathering up the household box of tin cans and carrying
it back into the woods where I dumped the cans into what we called "the
14. A Pareto improvement is a change that makes at least one party better off without making any
party worse off.
15. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, ch. V, para. 27 & 33 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1960).
16. See PETER H. GLEICK, WATER IN CRISIS (1993); Richard Conniff, California: Desert in
Disguise, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 1993, Special Edition, at 38-53.
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sink-hole," where the ground had conveniently opened up a depression. At
the time it seemed as if everyone who had a woods must have had a
sink-hole for their tin cans. I did not realize that something later to be
named "solid waste" would become a national problem, nor that "trash
collection" would become "waste management." By now, most
well-informed people understand the basic point about solid waste, although
the international traffic in toxic wastes, which are dumped in the poor
countries by rich countries with about as much concern or care as I
discarded my tin cans in the woods, is being kept as quiet as possible by the
rich.
t 7
The invisible non-solid wastes that seem to be drifting off harmlessly
into the sky and on into the endless universe are another story. Where
something visible to the human eye, like bad urban smog, results, people
notice, with or without taking action. Yet even reasonably well-informed
ordinary people have not internalized sufficiently what they may know in
the abstract about emissions of greenhouse gases into that great sewer, the
sky: there are natural limits, too, on what the sky can swallow up (without
effects, like the surface temperature rising). As Garrett Hardin, with whom
I profoundly disagree on the policy implications, is correct to keep insisting:
"One can never do merely one thing."' 8 The sky is not a great open pit
with the planet Pluto at the bottom; our own planet's atmosphere is a net
that catches many things, and greenhouse gases are among those things.
Without the greenhouse effect, the Earth would of course be uninhabitably
cold.
17. The Clinton Administration is opposing the movement to create a total ban on the shipment
of toxic waste produced in rich countries to poor countries; the U.S. wants to continue shipping its toxics
to poor countries whose governments provide "assurances" that they are handling them properly. The
ban is proposed under the now very weak Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. See Basel Convention Working Group Says Progress Made on
Waste Disposal Guidelines, 16(12) INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: CURRENT REPORTS 431-
32 (June 16, 1993). The Clinton Administration's position appears to be flatly in contradiction of
Principle 14, Rio DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: "States should effectively
cooperate to discourage or prevent the relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and
substances that cause severe environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health."
I have discussed some of the general issues underlying such practices in Henry Shue, Exporting Hazards,
91 ETHICS 579, 579-606 (1981) reprinted with revisions in BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND
ITS LIMITS, 107-45 (Peter G. Brown & Henry Shue eds., 1981).
18. GARREa HARDIN, LIVING WITHIN LIMITS 199 (1993). Cf David Feeny et al., The Tragedy
of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later, 18 HUMAN ECOLOGY 1, 1-19 (1990).
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There are two different points here we still fail to comprehend. The
underlying one is that, however imperceptible gases like CO2 may be to the
naked human eye, these gases are not nothing. There are limits to the net
quantities of these gases that the atmosphere can handle without making
adjustments, like surface temperature increases, that are quite uncongenial
to humans and many other species of plants and animals. Like a malign
Noah we will carry many other species along with us to their extinction.
Fully appreciating this is for many people (except the scientists who study
the dynamics at work) still a matter of a psychological incorporation, or
emotional internalization, of something we already know only in the
abstract, akin to a headline on CNN so devoid of context as to be virtually
meaningless except as an answer to a trivia question.
Much more intellectually revolutionary, and far less appreciated or
internalized by our economic and political leadership, is the ethical point
that these facts make applicable to us now. Since there are unchangeable
limits on the atmosphere's capacity to absorb net emissions (without
increases in surface temperature), there is a limited supply of absorptive
capacity. The capacity of the planetary atmosphere for gaseous emissions,
no less than the capacity of the local landfill for solid waste, is limited.
This capacity is valuable, indeed vital, but scarce. Who gets how much of
it, therefore, is a basic ethical issue. In particular, it raises all the questions
about justice that are raised by the choice of a process for allocating any
scarce natural resource, especially a resource essential for minimal economic
welfare or subsistence.
Three qualifications that are scientifically important should be noted,
although they in no way undercut the normative significance of the
realization of the limited capacity of the atmosphere for gases. First, it is
not the case that there is some natural limit on the total capacity of the
planet to deal with GHGs by all possible means. At least for naturally
occurring GHGs like C0 2, as opposed to human concoctions like the
chloroflurocarbons (CFCs), there are naturally occurring sinks as well as
natural sources. If one increases the supply of sinks (by, for example,
planting new forests), one can increase the supply of the gas without
increasing the net load upon the atmosphere. In this case the new terrestrial
sinks deal with the additional CO2 at the surface of the planet. Surface
recycling of CO 2 has been going on for millenia. All that coal and oil that
we have recently been gobbling up has, indeed, sequestered phenomenal
amounts of CO2, keeping it safely out of circulation. This is why it is such
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a horrific problem that over mere decades we are, by racing through the coal
and oil, thrusting carbon back into the atmosphere that had been removed
from it for millennia. It is net emissions to the upper atmosphere on which
there are limits. If increases in the supply of any gas are matched by
increases in the supply of its sinks, everything is handled at the surface and
there is no net increase in atmospheric levels. We are, of course, not adding
sinks remotely as fast as we are pouring carbon into the atmosphere by
burning oil and coal. On the contrary, we are not making a net addition of
sinks at all. We are both vastly increasing the supplies of CO 2 and
simultaneously significantly decreasing the sinks for CO2 (e.g., cutting down
more forests than we plant). So we are compounding net atmospheric
levels. It is difficult to imagine how we could be doing more to upset the
carbon balance if we tried. 19
Second, a technical point simply needs to be acknowledged. Evidently,
as the concentration of CO 2, in particular, in the atmosphere increases the
capacity of the oceans to sequester CO2 also increases. The increase in the
ocean's capacity to absorb, however, by no means matches the increase in
atmospheric concentration, nor is it unlimited.2 ' Hence, the same scientists
who point out that one should note this variable oceanic sequestering for full
accuracy also emphasize that one should take no great comfort from it. So,
for all practical purposes, the limit of net atmospheric emissions that can be
handled without increases in surface temperature is fixed.
19. For a straightforward and short overview pointing to more technical discussions in the same
volume, see IRVING M. MINTZER, Living in a Warming World, in CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE:
RISKS, IMPLICATIONS AND RESPONSES 1-13 (Irving M. Mintzer ed., 1992). For a more passionate but
no less well-informed, sadly beautiful, and book-length treatment of the profound human significance
of human-induced climate change, see BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1990).
20. Some had hoped that the "fugitive carbon," the unaccounted-for difference between
calculations of sources and calculations of sinks, would turn out to be in the oceans, proving them to be
a larger sink than previously thought. It now seems more likely that the sources have been over-stated
through over-estimates of the carbon released by deforestation, most notably in Brazil. See David Skole
and Compton Tucker, Tropical Deforestation and Habitat Fragmentation in the Amazon: Satellite Data
from 1978 to 1988, 260 SCIENCE 1905, 1909 (1993). See also R.T. Watson et al., Sources and Sinks,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 1992: THE SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT TO THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, 25,
25-46 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1992).
That the CO2 released by deforestation in the Third World was being over-estimated-in particular,
by World Resources Institute (WRI) in Washington-was the central scientific thesis in Anil Agarwal
& Sunita Narain, GLOBAL WARMING IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD: A CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
COLONIALISM (1991). Their political thesis, that Third-World deforestation was being intentionally
exaggerated in order to blame more of global warming on the Third World, seems to me to be
groundless. Their ethical thesis I take very seriously. For subsequent analysis by WRI, see World
Resources Institute, 1992-93 REPORT 118-20, 348, 352-53 (1992).
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Third, besides the oceans there are other little-understood feedbacks,
with clouds being probably the most important. Some cloud activity
provides a negative feedback to global warming. No one fully knows the
overall effect of water vapor at various heights above the surface.
Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that some increases in global warming
will, for example, unleash water vapor from the surface into the air. This
will produce a negative feedback to the warming (e.g., by cloud blockage
of sunlight) which will actually increase the net amount of CO2 the
atmosphere could handle without further warming. One can only speculate
about the recursive feedbacks that would then occur.
Still, my fundamental point about limits and scarcity holds. Whatever
exactly the capacity for net atmospheric CO 2 (and other GHGs) is, that
capacity will be limited by natural processes not decided by humans. The
absorptive capacity may be scarce at a somewhat higher absolute amount,
or at a somewhat lower absolute amount, but it will be scarce. That is,
there will be much less than humans would like, at least as long as the
politically entrenched dependence on fossil fuel is perpetuated. How the
total amount of emissions is divided is important, and ethically charged,
without anyone's understanding the extraordinarily complex ricocheting
atmospheric phenomena that will determine the absolute level of the total.
Only if all the natural feedbacks taken together turned out luckily to be
strongly negative (against surface warming) and so negative that they always
stayed ahead of the pressure of endlessly increasing human emissions of
GHGs, would the problem of scarce absorptive capacity disappear.
However, there is no reason to count on that being the case.
Accordingly, I accept the following:
1. global warming is dangerous enough that it ought to be minimized,
at least until the costs of doing so in the quality of human life and the
enjoyment of basic rights, become excessive,
2. global warming can be minimized only if a constant global total of
GHG emissions is sustained (i.e. the total global GHG emissions must
soon stop rising), or
2 '. global warming can be minimized only if a constant global total of
GHG emissions much smaller than the global total in 1990 is reached
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and then sustained (i.e. total global GHG emissions must soon be
reduced significantly below the 1990 level).
For those who like the servings on their plate divided into facts and
values, (1) is my basic relevant value (2) and (2 ') are my basic relevant
facts. The difference between (2) and (2 ') is a scientific issue. I rely, as
I already mentioned, upon only the far weaker (2), although I am in fact
persuaded, by the breadth of the scientific consensus behind it, of (2 ").2
A naturally limited planetary capacity to absorb CO2 (and other GHGs) and
a consequent shortage of emissions capacity relative to human demand need
to be handled in some civilized manner. How should that scarce capacity
be allocated among humans?
IV. PRE-AGREEMENT STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS
Before we take up this question, it may be worth discussing its origins.
We had turned to the question of what I would like to call the true
"mitigation budget," as distinguished from the no-regrets budget that could
take measures to eliminate waste with no long-term costs. Unlike the
no-regrets budget, the true mitigation budget involves expenditures directed
solely at global warming. In principle, there is a total annual mitigation
budget for the globe, the overall amount that would be reasonable to spend
each year to control GHG emissions (that is, either [2] to stop total global
GHG emissions from rising or [2 '] to reduce total global GHG emissions
to a lower sustainable level).22 It is far more likely that enough will be
spent actually to do the job of controlling emissions if there is agreement
about how the totals are to be shared across nations. In any case, extensive
international negotiations have in fact been underway to formulate an
21. The difference between (2) and (2 ') does not matter here because either way we have a
naturally limited total of a valuable resource, permissible emissions of GHGs, that must be allocated
across humanity. The difference between (2) and (2 ') matters greatly as one spells out distributive
principles more fully and concretely because, generally speaking, the more severe the scarcity, the more
radical the principles appropriate. On the scientific questions, see the sources cited in note 6 above.
22. Needless to say, all kinds of issues arise about how to arrive at annual totals, most notably
issues about allocations across generations. Simply in order to try to deal with one impossibly difficult
problem at a time, I am restricting my attention here to issues about how to share the costs (to be borne
at any one time) across nations. Obviously the international and the intergenerational are interconnected,
and one will almost certainly need later to revise whatever will have been said about one as soon as one
can see what to say about the other.
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agreement allocating the costs.23 For obvious reasons, only a few nations
will take expensive measures without assurance that other nations will do
their part as well.
The original question was: how should the total costs of mitigation be
shared? By what principles should portions of the total be assigned among
various nations (or other parties)? My suggestion earlier was that it would
make a great deal of difference if some nations were, at the start of the
mitigation process, already doing something wrong. The purpose of the
intervening discussion about naturally limited supplies was to provide the
background to make judgments about nations doing wrong. In what sense
could a nation already be doing something wrong before any agreement had
been reached about who should pay for what? Once there is an international
agreement specifying how much of the total costs of mitigation each nation
should bear, a nation obviously could do wrong by failing to provide its
share of the costs. This would be a wrong specifically in the form of an
unfairness: an agreement would specify fair shares of the total cost, and
then a nation would refuse to bear its share while other nations paid their
shares.24 But how could a nation be doing anything wrong before any
agreement had been made specifying who was to pay for what?
In fact, we do not generally believe that one is bound to do only what
one has explicitly and voluntarily agreed to do. On the contrary, we
regularly judge agreements to be fair and unfair, which reflects the fact that
we take some elemental principles of fairness to be more fundamental than
explicit agreements and to include standards that agreements themselves
23. See generally, Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451 (1993).
24. I do not believe that one is bound to do one's share only if everyone else is doing hers. If
the shares are indeed fair, and if the undertaking in question does not depend for its success on
unanimous cooperation, one is, I think, normally bound to do one's own share in spite of unfair
non-performance by others. This does not mean, of course, that one should make fruitless contributions
merely because they were part of an original plan that is subsequently coming unstuck. Presumably
helping to control global warming is less like helping to construct an arch than a wall: an arch will
collapse if not every stone is put into place-so trying somehow to stick one's own stone into place in
the absence of others is pointless-but a wall that is not as tall as it was supposed to be may stand
nevertheless and may do some good-so one should add the stone one promised even in the face of
betrayal by others. David Hume used the metaphor to contrast benevolence and justice as he understood
them. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 305-06 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 3d ed. 1975), quoted and discussed in BRIAN BARRY,
THEORIES OF JUSTICE: A TREATISE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE 150-52 (1989). See also Brian Barry, Can
States be Moral? International Morality and the Compliance Problem, in LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS
IN POLITICAL THEORY 171-74 (1991).
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must satisfy in order to be binding.25 This means that there are elemental
moral standards that laws, treaties, and other human agreements must satisfy
in order to deserve compliance-in order to be morally as well as legally
binding. In the extreme case, civil disobedience may be considered
necessary when what is legally binding is believed to violate more
fundamental standards that are morally binding.
Since these standards might be in some sense prior to human
conventions, one is tempted to call them "natural. 26 That is a mistake.
That conceptualization creates unnecessary problems, introduces false issues,
and invites misleading comparisons. It is enough for present purposes to
notice that there is a standard human practice of assessing agreements as fair
and unfair, which it is very difficult to imagine giving up or wanting to give
up.27 Regardless of whether this reflects anything "natural," it certainly
reflects something very deep, which ordinary people respect and are not
about to abandon (nor is there any reason why they should). This is
enough. So I will speak of pre-agreement standards and post-agreement
standards. The latter are based upon particular agreements. The former are
used to judge which agreements to take seriously, and include standards of
fairness.
V. EXCESS AND ENCROACHMENT
Thus, the suggestion is this: prior to any agreement about how the costs
of mitigation ought to be shared, a nation might be doing something
wrong-as judged by a pre-agreement standard of fairness. It could be
using more than its fair share of the naturally limited supply of capacity to
absorb emissions, thus producing more than its share of emissions. I will
explain this against the background provided by the preceding discussion of
naturally limited supplies.
25. Even the Western social-contract theorists, who probably assigned about as exaggerated a role
in human life to voluntary agreement as one conceivably could, all without exception assumed "natural
rights" that were more fundamental than agreements and contracts and could not be violated by any
contract that anyone could be bound to keep.
26. See Joseph Boyle, Natural Law and International Ethics in TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
ETHics 112-35 (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992).
27. We also assess agreements as voluntary and involuntary, which reflects another kind of
standard that is more fundamental than any particular agreement. Many have thought this reflects a
"natural" right to liberty.
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It is essential to notice that my focus of attention has moved from shares
of mitigation costs to shares of GHG emissions, from dollars to gases. The
proposed connection between gases and dollars is this: a country has no
right to emit gases in excess of its pre-agreement fair share. Not only does
one have no right to produce those emissions, but it is wrong to produce
them because, in using up a scarce and valuable capacity, a country is
unfairly impinging upon the fair shares of others to the extent that it is
exceeding its own share. Consequently, even prior to any agreement about
sharing mitigation costs, a country ought to eliminate the emissions that go
beyond its entitlement. The costs of cutting back those emissions and the
costs of stopping unfair wronging, ought to be paid no matter what (even if
there should be no agreement to undertake other mitigation of global
warming). Most particularly, a country ought not to use the threat of
refusing to cut back the excess emissions as leverage in the bargaining over
the terms of any cooperative mitigation effort. A threat to refuse to stop
doing what is wrong is simple bullying in any case.
The preceding paragraph highlights two separate theses. One is that it
makes sense to talk about fair shares of emissions quite apart from
international agreements-violating pre-agreement fairness is wrong. The
other is that ceasing to commit wrongs is not an acceptable part of the quid
pro quo of the bargaining about further mitigation. That this kind of
bullying is unacceptable within any process of bargaining that purports to
be fair is readily apparent, but it is a somewhat separate point from the fact
that not all judgments of fairness depend upon prior agreements.
Three aspects of the nature of pre-agreement unfairness merit discussion.
First, the kind of wrong involved in exceeding one's share of allowable
emissions has nothing to do with intention or foreseeability. One can wrong
others without intending to and without having been able to foresee that one
would. Naturally, it is worse still to commit any given wrong with foresight
or intention than to do the same thing without them, but the absence of
intention and foreseeability by no means eliminate the wrongful character
of many acts. As a general point, this is uncontroversial; it is simply worth
noticing.
Second, if the first point were not true, it would not affect present and
future emissions. Once we know that we are exceeding our share, we are
certainly not any longer doing so either unintentionally or without foresight.
On the contrary, we are continuing to exceed our share in full knowledge
that this is what we are doing and only because we do not choose to stop.
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Hence, future emissions become the key to reducing GHG levels. Although
I do not think that lack of intention or foresight carry much weight, they are
simply irrelevant to future emissions. Now we know: future harms are
foreseen.
Third, and by far most important, the seriousness of this wrong derives
from the fact that anyone's excess comes out of other peoples' shares. It is
one thing simply "to make a pig of oneself' in a context in which one's
own gluttony has no effects on others. While simple gluttony is at least a
minor vice, in isolation from bad effects on others it might not be a major
one. The point is that in GHG emissions there is no surplus from which
gluttons can indulge themselves. The supply of emissions-absorbing
capacity is too small relative to the demand, but cannot be increased, and
therefore is zero-sum. Because the total is, for all practical purposes, fixed,
anyone's excess encroaches upon someone else's share. It deprives them
of something they badly need. Excess consumption of emissions-absorption
capacity is wrong because it makes others seriously worse off by being
unfair to them.
VI. BY WHAT STANDARD UNFAIR?
Noticing that there is, in general, such a thing as pre-agreement fairness,
which most would readily acknowledge, is different from discovering what
in particular is fair and unfair in specific contexts. One could grant all that
has just been said about how wrong it would be to exceed one's share of
emissions, where the capacity to absorb them was scarce and valuable, and
still not know what counts as one's share or on what grounds that is
decided. What is a fair share? What is the decision that it is fair based
upon? Our case is, I believe, one of those not uncommon ones in which
specifying the precise location of a boundary--in this case, between fair and
unfair shares of a limited total of emissions--is theoretically challenging and
fascinating, but judging in actual practice whether some parties have crossed
the line is as easy as can be. When a ball lands near the line, it is
challenging and interesting to discuss what counts as the edge of the line.
When the ball lands among the spectators, the ball is out. In the case of
GHG emissions by the rich industrialized countries, we know that the ball
is out of bounds even though we can imagine closer calls that might arise
in future and might leave us then to scratch our heads. For now, we know
all that we need to know in order to judge and to act.
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Sources vary on the precise details, but the general shape of things could
not possibly be clearer. CO2 is both the most important GHG produced by
human activity and the only GHG for which there are anything like accurate
estimates. Thomas E. Drennen has calculated that the industrialized
countries, with 15.7% of the global population, emit 48.5% of the carbon,
while the developing countries (not including China), with 51.9% of the
population, emit 14.9% of the carbon. China accounts for 23.5% of the
people and 10.3% of the carbon, while the Commonwealth of Independent
States and Eastern Europe have 8.8% of the people and 26.2% of the
carbon.2" Thus, "citizens of the industrialized world are responsible for
emitting 11.9 tons of CO 2 per capita per year, ten times more than their
counterparts in developing countries (1.1 tons). 29  Thomas Drennen
implicitly makes what I take to be the absolutely correct judgment that it is
individual persons who are our ultimate concern. In addition to per capita
measures, there are measures of emissions per square mile, per unit of GNP,
and various other variables, but these other measures seem to me to be less
central. It is the needs of individual human lives that finally matter.
When one adds in the facts, first, that the total emissions must be held
constant and, second, that many of those whose emissions are only one-tenth
the emissions of others are living in extreme poverty which they can exit
only via economic development that would sharply increase their emissions
per capita, it becomes clear that some very powerful justification would be
needed to show that the status quo is acceptable. One need not be an
egalitarian to conclude that it is unacceptable that a small minority should
live in economic conditions 900% better than the conditions in which the
majority of humans (51.9%) live. Of course much of the industrialized
emissions are the result of sheer waste of energy, not superior quality of life,
so perhaps real quality of life is only 800% or 700% of the quality of life
of the world's majority. Would it be morally tolerable for a minority to live
100% better than the global majority? That is, at least, worth discussing.
Is it morally tolerable for a minority to live 900% better than the global
majority when the shares in economic welfare are zero-sum? I cannot
imagine any plausible reasons for continuing to maintain arrangements that
produce such radical inequalities in the prospects for different human lives.
28. Thomas E. Drennen, Economic Development and Climate Change: Analyzing the
International Response 142 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University).
29. Id., at 8.
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Only after we have reduced the inequalities to levels at which we are living
only, say, five or six times as well as the majority of our fellows need we
seriously worry whether we are overdoing it and earnestly search for the
precise line between unacceptable and acceptable inequalities.
VII. THREE ALTERNATIVES
In sum, I see only three choices. First, reduce GHG emissions at the
expense of the industrialized peoples through investment in research and
development to produce economically feasible non-carbon-based energy,
which might improve the quality of life and might not reduce the standard
of living. Second, reduce the GHG emissions at the expense of the
industrialized peoples through reduction in their energy-consuming economic
activity, which will certainly reduce the standard of living and may or may
not reduce the quality of life. Or third, continue the annual increases in
GHGs pumped into the upper atmosphere as the rich get richer and the poor
become more numerous and/or possibly slightly less poor.
Either of the first two choices would require considerable initiative and
imagination. Since the third requires only business as usual, I sadly expect
the third, which I have argued here is grossly unfair and which a consensus
of scientists is arguing is possibly catastrophic. "Too sophisticated to burn
books, we bum the planet."3  And only a few of us briefly warm
ourselves even from that.
30. BILL MCKIBBEN, THE AGE OF MISSING INFORMATION 85 (1992).
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